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AN EVENT DRIVEN SINGLE GAME SOLUTION FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATON IN
A MULTI-CRISIS ENVIRONMENT

Rashmi S. Shetty

ABSTRACT

The problem of resource allocation and management in the context of multiple crises
occurring in an urban environment is challenging. In this thesis, the problem is formulated using
game theory and a solution is developed based on the Nash equilibrium to optimize the allocation
of resources to the different crisis events in a fair manner considering several constraints such as
the availability of resources, the criticality of the events, the amount of resources requested etc.
The proposed approach is targeted at managing small to medium level crisis events occurring
simultaneously within a specific pre-defined perimeter with the resource allocation centers being
located within the same fixed region. The objective is to maximize the utilization of the
emergency response units while minimizing the response times. In the proposed model, players
represent the crisis events and the strategies correspond to possible allocations. The choice of
strategies by each player impacts the decisions of the other players. The Nash equilibrium
condition will correspond to the set of strategies chosen by all the players such that the resource
allocation optimal for a given player also corresponds to the optimal allocations of the other
players. The implementation of the Nash equilibrium condition is based on the Hansen’s
combinatorial theorem based approximation algorithm. The proposed solution has been

vi

implemented using C++ and experimental results are presented for various test cases. Further,
metrics are developed for establishing the quality and fairness of the obtained results.

vii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Over the decades, crisis management has developed into a complex and multifaceted
issue. The nature of a crisis or a disaster ranges from natural disasters like hurricanes and
earthquakes to man-made crises like plane crashes, terrorist attacks, willful acts of mass
destruction, industrial accidents, etc. With the development in infrastructure, the impact on a
community in terms of damage to property and loss of lives due to the occurrence of a crisis
necessitates the need for an organized and effective crisis management system. The scope of a
crisis management system includes but is not limited to risk analysis, sensing, responding,
monitoring and mitigating the effects of a crisis.

1.1

Crisis Management
Every community is equipped with an array of emergency response units to cater to

varied crisis scenarios. Effective recovery from a crisis requires immediate deployment of
requested units to the crisis locations. The complexity of this arises from the heterogeneity of
emergency response units, e.g., fire engines, ambulances and police cars. Furthermore, these units
are distributed over a wide area and control-led by multiple organizations. Each crisis is unique in
its severity, request for number and type of resources, location and potential growth. In the event
of multiple simultaneous crises, it is critical to ascertain the severity of each crisis and allocate the
optimum number and appropriate type of emergency units to each location. Depending on the

1

Fig 1.1 Crisis Scenario
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location and nature of the crisis, there may be additional requests for emergency units to prevent
further deterioration of a situation. Although, some crises may be more critical than others, all of
them need to be serviced immediately to prevent spawning of additional crises and further
damage. The main aim of allocation of emergency services is maximization of the utility of
existing and available emergency response units and minimization of response time to mitigate
the effects of one or many crises. Fig 1.1 illustrates a scenario to facilitate further understanding
of the situation.

Let us assume a hypothetical crisis scenario in a city.
•

A plane crashes as it lands in the airport. It is a small passenger plane with 30-35 people
including the crew. The crash has affected 2-3 planes parked at their terminals at the
airport.

•

A fire breaks out in an apartment on the sixth floor of a high-rise building trapping the
people within the apartment. The fire is slowly spreading to other apartments on the same
floor and the one above.

•

A demonstration in front of the town hall has turned into a riot. A few members of the
riot have become violent and are throwing inflammable objects all around the area.

Each of the above incidents qualifies as a crisis although each varies in its degree of criticality
and the number of resources it requires. The plane crash has the highest priority because of the
casualties and the possibility of worsening. The airplanes have fuel in them which is highly
inflammable and as other planes have been affected, the explosion has to be controlled before it
spreads to the airport and causes further damage. The fire is next in priority and has to be
controlled before it consumes the entire building and causes further damage to life and property.
The riot comes next in terms of criticality. In the scenario, we consider three types of resources
available – ambulances from the two hospitals, police cars from the police station and fire engines
from the fire department. The plane crash and the fire scene would require fire engines and
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ambulances. Both the locations might require a few police cars to regulate the population and
direct people to safety. The riot scene would require a lot of police cars to control the crowd,
maintain law and order and prevent stampedes. It would also need a few ambulances for riot
casualties and fire engines to control fires started by rioters. A lot of factors like availability,
distance, traffic conditions, etc determine how many resources are dispatched to the crisis
locations and from which resource center. For example, there are two hospitals, Hospital A and
Hospital B. It is important to note that Hospital A is closer to the riot than Hospital B. Hence, it is
more practical to send more ambulances from Hospital A to the riot than Hospital B. However,
the plane crash would receive more ambulances in total than the riot due to its higher criticality.
It is highly possible that there may not be sufficient number of ambulances and fire engines as
compared to the requests made by the crisis locations. Hence it is critical to make an optimal
allocation of resources as under or over utilization of resources could cost lives. The allocation
has to weigh in factors such as criticality of crises, request and availability of resources, distance
and number of resource centers.

1.2

Crisis Management Systems/Agencies
Several agencies have been set up and systems have been designed to monitor and

mitigate the effects of crises. We will review some of the salient features of these agencies and
systems.
1.2.1

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
The Federal Emergency Management Agency - a former independent agency that became

part of the new Department of Homeland Security in March 2003 – has the task of responding to,
planning for, recovering from and mitigating against disasters. FEMA can trace its beginnings to
the Congressional Act of 1803, a piece of disaster management legislation, which provided
assistance to a New Hampshire town following an extensive fire. In the century that followed, ad
hoc legislation was passed more than 100 times in response to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and
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other natural disasters. Over the course of the last few years, nuclear power plants, transportation
of hazardous substances and civil defense responsibilities were added to this agency further
compounding the complexity of emergency management.

Research

Development
Review Law, Plans,
Mutual Aid
Agreements and
Guidance

Validation

Conduct
Hazard/Risk
Analysis

Maintenance
Determine
Resource Base

Note Special
Facets of the
Planning
Environment

Fig 1.2 FEMA – SLG 101 Planning Process (Chapter 2)

According to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2003
– 2008:
•

Crisis/Disaster: Broadly defined to include disasters and emergencies that may be caused
by any natural or man-made event

•

Response: Conducting emergency operations to save lives and property, including
positioning emergency equipment and supplies; evacuating potential victims; providing
food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public
services
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•

Recovery: Rebuilding communities so individuals, businesses, and governmental
infrastructure can function on their own, return to normalcy, and are protected against
future hazards

Fig 1.2 shows an excerpt from the State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard
Emergency Operations Planning – Chapter 2. These are guidelines to emergency preparedness.
The grey boxes indicate those tasks which are relevant to resource allocation. Any proposed
solution would require complete information about the resource base, topography, jurisdiction

Needs Analysis
•
Receive requests
•
Prioritize events
•
Pass requests
•
Track request status
•
Report resource status to RM

Resource Manager

Supply Coordination
•
Procure personnel and units
•
Coordinate transport

Coordination
•
Coordinate routing,
reception, storage and
handling of stocks

Fig 1.3 FEMA – SLG 101 Resource Management Organization (Chapter 6)

and classification of priority. After collecting information about resources and possible hazards, a
system needs to have guidelines on distribution of resources. Fig 1.3 gives a brief outline of the
resource management organization as proposed by Chapter 6 of FEMA – SLG 101. The shaded
region has relevance to our work in terms of acquiring real-time resource updates, prioritization
of events and dispatching resources.
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1.2.2 INFOSPHERE – Sense and Respond Systems
The Caltech Infospheres Project [72] is devoted to research on compositional systems or,
systems built from interacting components. One of the applications of this project includes a
“sense and response” system. The basic purpose of the system is to hold a repository of data from
multiple sources and normalize it to a standardized vocabulary. Certain conditions are specified
that generate system alerts. The system monitors data from various institutions and when the
specified condition is met, alerts are sent securely to the destination. The system can be
programmed for specific applications, for e.g., an airplane switches to a different mode when the
system detects an equipment malfunction. The data sources monitored for specific applications
are immense in terms of volume, speed, heterogeneity and distributed nature. The proposed
system is evaluated on the basis of – frequency of errors, response time, computational resources
consumed, scalability and ease of adaptation. Fig 1.4 gives an overview of the control flow of the
proposed system.

Configure a set of sense-respond conditions for an application

Monitor data from agencies to detect significant changes in data values

Detect when specific (alert) conditions are met

Disseminate secure alerts to destinations

Fig 1.4 Infosphere – An Overview
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1.2.3

CMS (Crisis Management System)
CMS [71] is a powerful crisis management software developed by Applied Science

Associates, Inc. It has been designed as a tool for marine emergency response managers to model
the impacts and biological effects of spill or a disaster. It can be used for training and simulation
exercises, cost-benefit analysis and facilitate real-time response to marine disasters. Its interface
has been designed for an oil spill, chemical spill, search and rescue mission, marine emergency
and nuclear disaster. All the machines part of CMS are connected to a single resource database
and enable immediate access to resource information. It is equipped with a Geographical
Information System (GIS) to obtain real-time environmental information. It is used for
management and distribution of information for an organization handling response and recovery.

1.3

Motivation and Contributions
Multi-crisis management is a complex problem encompassing sensing, responding and

recovering from crises. It is important to set good precedents for future occurrences to enable a
better level of preparedness and response to crises to minimize destruction of life and property. In
the previous section, we observe systems and agencies designed to improve and enhance the
ability of emergency response managers to make effective crisis management decisions. They are
primarily protocols or guidelines (like FEMA) for risk analysis, resource base analysis, and
coordination of personnel and resource units. Some others are alerting mechanisms (like
INFOSPHERE) used to monitor the activities of systems (a house, an airplane, city, etc). Systems
like CMS are tools to monitor crises and provide real-time updates on them and the resources sent
to mitigate their effects. While ample work has been done in collecting data regarding resources
and classification of crises, there has not been significant work to automate the allocation of
resources to crisis situations. The actual allocation of resources is made manually based on
predefined guidelines and protocols and real-time information gathered from the scenes and is
susceptible to human error.
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This work proposes a model that uses the same information and enumerates feasible
allocation strategies and determines an optimal set of strategies for managing each crisis. The
proposed application is based on an optimization algorithm to obtain the best possible allocation
that benefits all crisis locations. The multi-crisis scenario is modeled as a strategic game [22, 23]
where the crisis locations are considered as players and each possesses a set of strategies that
correspond to allocations from different resource centers. All the crises compete for the same set
of resources and their adversarial nature is used to model them as players in a noncooperative
game where each player tries to maximize his own utility. Each strategy of a crisis has an
associated cost which is a function of resources contributed and the time taken to service a crisis’
request. The strategy sets are inputs to the optimization algorithm. The algorithm uses an
objective function that associates a payoff with each allocation based on priority of a crisis, its
request, number of resources available and time taken to reach the crisis. The optimization
algorithm produces as an output an allocation of resources from each resource center to each of
the crises. It is based on the principle of the Nash Equilibrium [22, 23, 69, 70] which provides a
socially viable solution whereby any player which deviates from the equilibrium strategy will
earn less than if it remained in its current strategy.

1.4

Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 briefly looks at other algorithmic

approaches to solving resource allocation problems and the approach used in this work. We
explain the reasons for adopting game theoretic concepts to our problem. Chapter 3 introduces us
to the formulation of the problem and the algorithmic design. We explain the constraints of the
problem and the objective function used. Chapter 4 presents the experimental results followed by
conclusions and an overview of future work in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK

Technological advances over the last few decades have drastically decreased the time
delay between theoretical progress and its practical impact. One such subject which has been
widely researched is resource allocation and it has found numerous applications in load
distribution [10], production planning [11], computer scheduling [12] and many other areas.
Since Koopman’s work [5] on the optimal distribution of effort in 1953, a significant number of
papers [2, 3, 4, 6, 7] have been published on the subject. The allocation of resources is an
optimization problem with the constraint – given a fixed quantity of a resource type, determine its
allocation to a set of activities, such that the objective function or (in our case) the payoff function
is optimized. Formally, this can be stated as follows [1]:
Resource:

minimize f ( x1 , x2 ,..., xn )
n

Subject to

∑x
j =1

j

=N,

where x j ≥ 0 ,

j = 1, 2, …, n

Here, x j represents the amount of the resource that is allocated to activity j and f represents the
objective function. N represents the total amount of the resource available and n, the total number
of activities. The objective value f ( x1 , x2 ,..., xn ) could be a cost, a reward, profit or loss as a
result of the allocation. If the resource is divisible, it can be represented by any nonnegative value
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Resource Allocation

Constraints

Objective Function

Discrete/ Continuous
Lower/upper bound

Algorithmic Approaches

Separable

Dynamic Programming [51,52,53]

Convex

Integer Programming [59,60,61]

Concave

Lagrange Multiplier [56,57,58]

Fair

Simulated Annealing [29,30,31]

Minimax

Genetic Algorithm [38,39,40]
Branch and Bound [43,44,45]
Game theory [73,74,75]
Greedy [48,49,50]
Tabu Search [65,66,67]
Miscellaneous Algorithms

Fig 2.1 Criteria for Resource Allocation
and x j is a continuous variable. The resource may not be divisible if it represents persons,

lj ≤ xj ≤ uj ,

j = 1, 2, …, n

vehicles, parts and so on. In the context of this work, x j is a discrete variable that can be
represented only in nonnegative integer values. Sometimes, lower bounds (other than/greater than
0) and/or upper bounds are imposed such that, it is required to allocate atleast l j and at most u j
resources to activity j [1].

The choices of algorithms for resource allocation depend on how efficiently an objective function
can be exploited. Some of the typical forms of objective functions are [1]:
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∑

n

f j (x j ) , where each f j is a function of one variable

•

Separable:

•

Convex [9]: A function f(x) is convex if, on an interval [x, y], for any points a1 and a 2 in

j =1

the interval [x, y], f [1 2 ( x1 + x 2 )] ≤ 1 2 [ f ( x1 ) + f ( x 2 )] .
•

Concave [9]: A function f(x) is concave if, on an interval [x, y], for any points a1 and

a 2 in [x, y], the function –f(x) is convex on that interval.

( )

( )

•

Minimax: Minimize max j f j x j ; and Maximin: maximize min j f j x j

•

Fair: Minimize g( max j f j x j , min j f j x j ), where g(u, v) is nondecreasing

( )

( )

(respectively, nonincreasing) with respect to u(respectively, v)

2.1 Types of Algorithmic Approaches to Resource Allocation
Several algorithmic solutions and their generalizations have been proposed to obtain
optimal solutions to the resource allocation problem. In this chapter, we will examine some of the
widely used algorithms to solve the resource allocation problem and examine how game theory is
well suited for modeling the solution in our case. Although we examine algorithmic approaches
to solving discrete and continuous resource allocation problems, we emphasize discrete
algorithms due to its relevance in this work.

2.1.1 Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming typically applies to optimization problems where we make a set
of choices to obtain an optimal solution. There may be several solutions to obtain the optimal
value. A dynamic-programming algorithm can be categorized into four steps:
•

Define the structure of an optimal solution

•

Recursively define an optimal solution

•

Compute an optimal solution in a bottom-up manner
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•

Build an optimal solution from the information obtained in the previous steps

In [13], a dynamic programming formulation is used for a time-optimal multi-agent task
assignment problem. Here, m tasks are to be assigned to n agents, with m ≤ n, and one agent can
perform only one task. A task assignment algorithm for a global optimal task assignment is
obtained based on a problem specific recurrence relation derived using the Principal of
Optimality [14]. Next, a dynamic programming styled time-optimal task assignment algorithm is
constructed since each stage of the algorithm is based on the recurrence relation derived earlier.
Dynamic programming is similar to the divide-and-conquer problem. However, the latter
approach is not suitable for cases when there are common subproblems as it solves them
repeatedly. Dynamic programming solves each subproblem just once and saves it in a table and
thereby avoids recomputation every time the subproblem is encountered. However, the
disadvantage of dynamic programming is that when it is applied to any multistage optimization
problem, the dimensionality explodes when there are several state variables and each of them has
large discretization
•
•
•
•
•

Define a non-empty state space X with a finite set of states
Define a finite set of actions, U(x) that can be applied from a state x Є X
Let k Є {1…K+1} where k is a stage. We assume that K is larger than the longest optimal path
between any two states Є X
Let F = K + 1 where F is the final stage
x k +1 = f ( x k , u k ) for xk Є X and uk Є U( xk ) where f denotes the state transition equation

•

Let

•

Define an additive loss function L,

x1 denote the initial state and x g denote the state we want to reach or the goal state
K

L = ∑ l ( xk , u k ) + l F ( xF )
k =1

where
•

•

l F ( xF ) = 0, if x f = xG and l F ( xF ) = ∞ otherwise

uT Є U(x), such that if uT is applied to xk , then the action is
repeatedly applied until stage K, and the state remains in xk until the final stage. Also,
l ( x k , uT ) = 0 for any k and xk
Find u1 .........u K that minimizes L
Define a termination action

Fig 2.2 Generic Algorithm for Dynamic Programming [15]
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levels. In our case, the state variables would correspond to the number of units in each resource
center. Also, the computational cost of the proposed algorithm grows rapidly with the number of
agents making it infeasible for a large number of agents. Inspite of the curse of dimensionality,
we find dynamic programming being applied to a variety of resource allocation scenarios as
described in [51, 52, 53, 54, 55].

2.1.2 Integer Programming
Many optimization problems can be expressed as linear or nonlinear
programming problems. A linear program is a problem which can be expressed as follows:
Minimize

cx

Subject to

Ax = b

x≥0

where x is a vector of variables to be solved and A is the matrix of coefficients, and c and b are
vectors of known coefficients. “cx” is referred to as the objective function, and the expression “Ax
= b” is called a constraint. A nonlinear program is a problem of the form,
Minimize

f(x)

Subject to

gi(x) = 0

for i = 1, …, m1 where m1 ≥ 0

hj(x) ≥ 0

for j = m1 + 1, …, m

f(x) is a an objective function consisting of several variables and the other two functions are
constraints. If the unknown variables are required to be integers, as is the case with this work,
then the problem is referred to as integer programming. If the problem requires only some of the
variables to take on integer values, it is called mixed integer programming. Although this is more
realistic, it is harder to solve. Integer programming techniques can be applied over a substantial
range of problem sizes and applications. The work in [16] integer linear programming is used to
improve bandwidth efficiency in networks using a segment protection algorithm. An active path
(AP) in a network is divided into several active segments (AS) which are protected by backup
segments (BS). In case of a failure, the traffic is rerouted through a BS. Integer linear
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programming is used to determine an optimal partition of a given AP into ASs and find the
corresponding BSs. The work in [17] uses integer linear programming to obtain an optimal
allocation of registers for general purpose processors and embedded systems. Although integer
programming techniques are known to provide optimal solutions, in both the works above it has
been found that they can be used for medium sized and not large networks (in the first case) and
solution times are slow (in the second case). Integer programs are undecidable in the worst case
and in some cases found to be NP-Hard. [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64] are some works which use pure
integer and mixed integer programming techniques for their resource allocation problems.

2.1.3 Lagrange Multiplier Method
In mathematical optimization problems, Lagrange multipliers are used to deal with
problems with constraints. They are used to find the maxima or minima of a multivariate function
subject to a constraint [1].
Optimize f(x, y)
Subject to g(x, y) = 0
The Lagrangian is written as, L = f(x, y) + λ g(x, y) where λ is a constant called the Lagrange
multiplier. According to Lagrange’s multiplier method, the simultaneous conditions are,

 ∂L 
  = 0;
 ∂x  y

 ∂L 
  = 0;
 ∂y  x

The goal is to find the maximum and minimum values taken on by f along the curve with the
constraint on the points, g(x, y) = 0. The Lagrangian approach treats all variables and constraints
in a symmetrical fashion so that problems involving numerous variables and constraints can be
neatly organized. [18] uses Lagrangian methodology to schedule and allocate resources in a
manufacturing unit. The objective is to efficiently use limited resources to meet dynamic
customer requirements. Factories use a flexible manufacturing system by using production
layouts to simplify production flow lines and increase productivity. Scheduling is used to decide
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when to set up a cell for a production lot and the quantity of machines to allocate to the cell. The
machine capacities, processing time and the machine type are quantified as constraints. The
model uses Lagrange relaxation and forms a dual function by relaxing complicating constraints
with Lagrangian multipliers. The original problem is divided into subproblems which are easier to
solve. The model produces schedules which are 16%-29% within optimal. [19] is another work
using a similar approach to optimally allocate resources in a distributed computing environment.
Lagrangian relaxation and subgradient methods are applied to solve this problem. It was observed
that an optimal solution would occur in an earlier iteration without converging. It has been
observed that in the works above solutions to subproblems are not feasible and additional
heuristics are applied to arrive at feasible schedules. [56, 57, 58] are some other examples of the
application of the Lagrange multiplier method to the resource allocation problem.

2.1.4 Simulated Annealing
This algorithm is based on that of Metropolis et al. [9] to find an equilibrium configuration of a
collection of atoms at a given temperature. In 1973, Pincus et al. [26] drew an analogy between
this algorithm and mathematical minimization. It was proposed as an optimization technique for
combinatorial problems by [27]. Simulated annealing is a random search technique which has the
advantage of not getting trapped in local minima. It accepts changes that increase and decrease an
objective function f. An increase in the change is accepted with the probability p [28],
where p = e

 −δf 


 T 

. δt is the increase in f and T is a control parameter referred to as the “system

temperature”. [41] suggests that the initial temperature T0 has a significant impact on the
performance of the algorithm. The algorithm requires a problem-specific annealing schedule, i.e.
an initial temperature and the rules for lowering it as the search proceeds. Figure 2.2 shows the
structure of a simulated annealing algorithm. One of the major problems in the implementation of
simulated annealing lies in the difficulty of drawing an analogy between T and a free parameter in
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a real-life problem. Furthermore, staying out of local minima is dependent on the choice of an
annealing schedule, number of iterations performed for each temperature and the decrements of
temperature towards the cooling process. [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34] are some recent examples of the
practical applications of simulated annealing as an optimization algorithm.

Start

Input and examine initial solution

Determine initial value of T =

T0

Generate and examine new solution

Accept new
solution?

No

Yes
Update Stores
Adjust temperature

No

Terminate
search?
Yes
Stop

Fig 2.3 Structure of Simulated Annealing Algorithm [28]
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2.1.5 Genetic Algorithms
The framework for genetic algorithms lies in the natural evolution of species searching
for beneficial adaptations in a changing environment. Although the information encoded in the
chromosomes of individual members changes by random mutation, it is essentially a combination
of chromosomal material during breeding. In 1975, the incorporation of the principles of
evolution into optimization routines was formally established in [36]. To use a genetic algorithm,
we need to represent the solution as a genome (or chromosome). The algorithm takes as an input
an initial population of solutions and applies the genetic operators (mutation, crossover) to evolve
and find an optimum solution. The main aspects of applying genetic algorithms to real-life

Start

Generate random population of n chromosomes

Evaluate the fitness f(x) of each chromosome

Create a new population by performing selection,
crossover, mutation and accepting

Replace the current population with the generated population

No

Is end condition
satisfied?
Yes

Return best solution of the population

Stop

Fig 2.4 Structure of a genetic algorithm
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problems are: (i) defining an objective function; (ii) obtaining a genetic representation of the
solution; (iii) defining the genetic operators. The efficiency of a genetic algorithm is dependent
on the control parameters: (i) initial population, (ii) size of the population, N, iii) crossover
probability, Pc, (iv) mutation probability, Pm. Genetic algorithms are similar to simulated
annealing as both use probabilistic transition rules and use objective function information and not
derivatives [28]. Genetic algorithms, although computationally expensive, can be easily
parallelized as the evaluation of an objective function and constraints can be done simultaneously
for a whole population. The figure 2.3 shows the structure of a genetic algorithm. [38, 39, 40, 41,
42] are some of the recent works which use genetic algorithms to obtain optimal solutions for the
resource allocation problem.

2.1.6 Branch and Bound
Branch and bound is another algorithm used to solve optimization problems. It
searches the entire solution space for the best solution. However, as the number of possible
solutions increases exponentially, it becomes infeasible to enumerate all of them and hence we
use bounds for the function to be optimized. The algorithm consists of three main parts [37]:
•

A bounding function to determine the lower bound for the best solution in the given
subspace of the solution

•

A strategy for determining the next solution subspace to be analyzed. A branching rule to
be applied if a subspace after analysis cannot be excluded and further subdivide the
subspace into two or more subspaces

•

The performance of the branch and bound algorithm depends to a great degree on the
initial search space fed to the algorithm.

Convergence is ensured if the size of each generated subspace is smaller than the original one.
[43, 44, 45, 46] are works which employ the branch and bound algorithm to find optimal
solutions to their versions of the resource allocation problem. Although branch and bound
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Fig 2.5 Flow of Branch and Bound Algorithm
algorithms are favorable for discrete and continuous global optimization problems, they have
high memory requirements.

2.1.7 Greedy Algorithm
A greedy algorithm is one which follows a problem solving heuristic of making a locally
optimum choice in the hope of obtain a globally optimum solution. Greedy algorithms do not
always yield optimal solutions as they do not exhaustively examine all the possible solutions of a
search space. The basic elements of a greedy algorithm are [47]:
•

A solution space from which the solution is created

•

A selection function to choose the next best element to be added to the solution

•

A feasibility function to examine an element’s eligibility to be added to the solution

•

An objective function to calculate the value of the (full or partial) solution obtained

•

A solution function to determine if the complete solution has been reached

Greedy algorithms are rarely used to obtain optimal solutions and usually form the basis of a
heuristic approach. Even though there maybe problems which can be solved using the greedy

20

approach, establishing their optimality is non-trivial. [48, 49, 50] are examples of works use the
greedy approach to solve resource allocation problems. Typically, greedy approaches are not used
because of their unreliability in providing optimal solutions as is proved in the case of the work in
[50].

2.1.8 Tabu Search
A Tabu search is a global optimization algorithm which is a meta-heuristic imposed on
another heuristic. In 1977, Fred Glover introduced this approach of moving through a solution
space and using memory techniques to avoid cycling. The algorithm records moves in a Tabu list
and penalizes it if it takes the solution to a point in the solution space that has been previously
visited. Hence, the algorithm avoids getting trapped in cycles. Tabu search is still an evolving and
highly researched technique of optimization. Although Tabu search provides comparable or
superior solutions to optimization problems, it does not guarantee optimality. Also, the
construction of a Tabu list to keep a record of the moves is heuristic. [65, 66, 67, 68] are some of
the recent applications of Tabu search to practical problems.

2.2 Why Game Theory?
Game theory is a tool for modeling and analyzing conflict and cooperation between
decision makers called players [20]. Such a situation occurs when multiple decision makers with
different objectives act on a system or share resources. Game theory is considered to have been
formalized with the publishing of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s The Theory of Games and
Economic Behaviour in 1944. Game theory provides a natural framework for the modeling of the
crisis scenario in this thesis. In the context of this work, we use noncooperative games due to the
competitive nature of the players (or, crises in our case). Two or more crises compete for a
limited number of emergency units from various centers. They have a finite set of actions or
allocation strategies available to them, the choice of which leads to a well defined numerical
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payoff associated with the each combination of strategies and for each crisis. [21]The strategy
selected by a crisis depends on three parameters:
•

Strategy space which consists of the set of strategies (allocations) available to the crisis

•

Information about the other crises (priority, distance from resource center)

•

Payoff or utility function which quantifies the satisfaction a user can get from an outcome

Every player attempts to maximize his gain in the game. A significant aspect of game theory is
that each player’s decision is based on the decision of every other player and hence, each player
can optimize his gain with respect to every other player. This is quite useful in modeling the crisis
scenario where the overall optimization is feasible only if each crisis has been satisfied with
respect to all other crises. The adversarial nature of the game and the interdependence of each
player’s objective function on the decisions of the other players require the resource allocation
strategy to take into account all the other players’ objective functions. The Nash solution in game
theory provides an equilibrium solution taking into account the objective functions of all players.
A significant aspect of game theory is that it has been proven that a finite noncooperative game
has at least one Nash equilibrium [22]. This is motivation for us to use the Nash equilibrium as
we are guaranteed an equilibrium strategy set for a crisis scenario.

2.3 Game Theoretic Concepts
Games, as represented in game theory, consist of four essential elements – players,
actions, payoffs, and information. These constitute the rules of the game. Depending on the
information available, players try to maximize their payoffs by choosing strategies.
•

Players are the individuals/ entities who make decisions. Each player’s goal is to
maximize his utility by a choice of actions

•

An action or strategy of player i, denoted s i , is a decision he can make. Player i’s
action S i = { s i }, is the entire set of actions available to a player.
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•

By player i’s payoff π i ( s1 ,..., s n ) , we mean the utility received by player i after all
players have decided their strategies and the game has been played; or
The expected utility received as a function of the strategies chosen by the player i and the
other players

There are two kinds of strategies: pure and mixed [22]
A pure strategy maps each of a player’s possible information sets to one action.

si : ω i → ai
A mixed strategy maps each of a player’s possible information sets to a probability distribution
over actions

si : ω i → m(ai ) Where m ≥ 0 and

∫ m(a )da
i

i

=1

Ai

Here ω i refers to the information set.
A strategy combination s = (s1 ,..., s n ) is an ordered set consisting of one strategy from each of
the n players. Every player in a game maximizes its payoff and arrives at an equilibrium state. An
equilibrium s * = ( s1* ,..., s n* ) is a strategy combination of the best strategy for each player in an nplayer game. The strategy combination s * (a set of strategies) is a Nash equilibrium is, if any
player which deviates from its strategy will earn less than if it remained in its current strategy.
Formally, this can be stated as,

(

) (

)

∀i, π i s i* , s −*i ≥ π s 'i , s −*i , ∀s 'i
The inputs required to formulate Nash equilibrium are:
•

Strategies available for each player

•

Number of players in a game
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Some of the major categories of classifying games are as follows [25]:
•

Number n of players – A game can consist of one, two or n players

•

Number of strategies of players – This may be finite, a discrete infinite or a continuum

•

Zero-sum, constant-sum or general-sum – In a zero-sum game, the numerical payoffs to
the player after any possible play of the game sum up to zero. A constant-sum game is
one where the sum of all payoffs to the player is the same for any outcome. A generalsum game includes the other two.

•

Cooperative and noncooperative - In cooperative games, players communicate with one
another and can make binding commitments as opposed to noncooperative games

•

Complete and incomplete information

•

Single-stage or multi-stage games

Non cooperative games can be further classified into strategic (normal form) games and extensive
form games.
•

A normal form game is a game of complete information played between n players, each
having a strategy set, S i and a payoff function pi where pi :

∏

i≤n

S i → ℜ . If there are

a finite number of strategies, we can define a normal form game as a matrix. In such a
game, each player simultaneously selects a move si ∈ S i and receives a payoff

u i (s1 ,..., s n )
•

An extensive form game is one which can be represented as a connected tree with no
cycles and a distinguished node where each node represents a decision made by a player.
A function specifies which player moves at a node, what actions are available, and which
node comes next for each action [24].

For the modeling of the problem stated in this work, our definition of a finite game is a
noncooperative n-player game, with each player associated with a finite set of pure strategies; and
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corresponding to each player, i, a payoff function pi , which maps all the n-tuples of pure
strategies into real numbers. A tuple is a set of n strategies with each strategy associated with a
different player.
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CHAPTER 3
FORMULATION OF A GAME

The automation of the allocation of emergency response units is a logical step in crisis
management to minimize if not completely eliminate human errors in decision making. In this
work, we propose a game theoretic framework to address the problem of allocation of resources
to multiple crises. In drawing upon the concepts of game theory and consequently Nash
Equilibrium we obtain a framework in which we can address the issue of minimization of
response time, maximization of utility and fairness of the allocation. The idea of using a Nash
solution in the context of resource allocation is not new and has been implemented in several
areas [73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78]. In this chapter, we illustrate the transformation of a multi-crisis
environment into a noncooperative strategic game.

3.1

Crisis Scenario
We revisit the example presented in Chapter 1, Figure 1.1. Consider a hypothetical crisis

scenario as described in the figure – a plane crash, a fire and a riot. Tables 3.1 to 3.4 contain
information about resource types and availability, crisis requests, crisis priorities and time taken
to reach crises from each of the resource centers. In the given scenario, we note that the
requirement of crises exceeds the capacity of the resource centers. Typically, if the number of
resources available for dispatch were less than or equal to the requests made by crises, the
resource manager is left with the task of determining the distribution of resources from resource
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Table 3.1 Resource Types and Availability
Resource
Hospital A

Centers 

Hospital B

Police

Fire

Total

Station

Department

Availability

Resource Types

Ambulances

8

10

-

-

18

Police Cars

-

-

16

-

16

Fire Engines

-

-

-

14

14

Table 3.2 Crisis Types and Requests
Resource Types 
Ambulances

Police Cars

Fire Engines

Plane Crash

11

6

10

Fire

8

3

6

Riot

3

9

1

Total Request

22

18

17

Crisis 

Table 3.3 Crisis Priorities
Crisis 

Priority (1 - 10) 

Plane Crash

9

Fire

7

Riot

3
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Table 3.4 Time (in minutes) Taken to Reach Crises
Resource Centers 
Hospital A

Hospital B

Police Station

Fire Department

Plane Crash

30

7

31

24

Fire

18

15

33

8

Riot

8

11

13

3

Crisis 

centers between crises based on time taken to reach each crisis. Shortage of resources is not an
issue and every crisis is guaranteed satisfaction of its request. However, in the current scenario,
the resource manager has the additional task of determining the optimal allocation in the face of
shortage and possible starvation of lesser priority crises. For example, there are 10 + 8 = 18
ambulances. However, the total request for ambulances is 11 + 8 + 3 = 22 > 18 ambulances.
There are two hospitals, A and B and it is important to note that A is closer to the plane crash B
while allocating resources. Not only does a resource manager have to decide how many
ambulances have to be dispatched from Hospital A and B, he has to decide on an optimal
distribution based on severity and distance from crisis due to the shortage of ambulances. In our
methodology, we obtain an optimal solution for each type of resource separately, i.e., we
determine an allocation for ambulances, police cars and fire engines separately.

3.2

Modeling of Crisis Scenario as a Noncooperative Strategic Game
We apply game theoretic concepts to the crisis scenario resource allocation problem. As

mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the main elements of every game are players, actions,
payoffs and information.
In our model, each crisis is modeled as a player. The objective of each player is to
maximize its utility by choosing actions most beneficial to it The actions, in this case, will be the
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allocations to resource centers. For example, the plane crash, fire and riot have requested for 6, 3
and 9 police cars respectively. The action of sending 6 police cars to the plane crash, 2 police cars
to the fire and 8 police cars to the riot constitutes an allocation. In the context of this work, we
refer to the actions as strategies. The utilities are the payoffs received as a function of actions
chosen by other players. The framework rests on the modeling of the payoff function as it
captures the effect on other crises when one crisis chooses a particular strategy. The information
available to the players corresponds to requests, availabilities, priority and response time.
The conflicting objectives of the crises (players) contribute to the noncooperative nature
of the game. None of the crises make prior commitments to share or lend resources before the
game is played. This is a game of complete information as we play the game on the assumption
that we have the latest information updates on the resource availability and crisis requests. Also,
the information regarding time taken to reach a crisis location is assumed to be accurate. All the
crises will make their selections simultaneously in a game and the game can be represented in a
matrix where each cell represents a payoff value. Hence the game is a strategic or normal form
game where all crises have finite number of strategies in their sets and the players’ actions are
mapped to a probability distribution.

3.3

Notations
The following notations are used in this work:

n

Number of crises, n Є N

C

Set of crises, C = {C1, C2, C3,.....Cn}

m

Number of resource centers, m Є N

R

Set of resource centers, R = {R1, R2, R3.....Rm}

Q

Set of requirements of all crises, Q = {q1, q2, .....qi, .....qn}

qi

Number of resources requested by crisis Ci where qi Є N

O

Set of resources available at resource centers, O = {o1, o2, ......oi, ....om}
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oi

Number of resources available at resource center Ri where oi Є N

S

Set of strategies of all crises, S = {S1, S2,....Sn}

Si

Set of strategies of crisis Ci, Si = {si,1, si,2,.....,si,gi}

gi

Total number of strategies in Si

si,j

jth strategy of the ith crisis, si,j Є Si

rk

Number of resources contributed by kth resource center, rk ≤ ok

Li

Priority of ith crisis, i = 1, 2, .... 10 where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest level

T

Set of response times of resources from resource center to crises, where T = {ti,j}

ti,j

Time to by jth resource center to reach ith crisis

NSi

Set of strategies constituting the Nash Equilibrium solution
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION MODEL USING NASH EQUILIBRIUM

The optimal allocation of resources in the crisis scenario is dependent on the modeling of
the problem. In the previous chapter, we observed the transformation of such a scenario into a
noncooperative game as it provides a framework for analyzing strategic interactions. In this
chapter, the details of this transformation are presented. We propose a definition of a strategy in
the context of this thesis and elaborate the process of the formulation and pruning of the strategy
space. The basic idea behind this approach is to apply heuristics to eliminate strategies which
contribute to infeasible and “poor” solutions. Another goal is to control the explosion of the
strategy space as the dimension of the problem increases. The computation of a Nash Equilibrium
increases in complexity as the strategy space grows and hence it becomes necessary to prune the
strategy space. After the strategy spaces are constructed, we play a noncooperative strategic game
and obtain a probability distribution over the strategy set of each crisis which is used to determine
the allocations.

4.1 Structure of a Strategy
A game is modeled around its information set and a strategy captures the essence of this
information in formulating an “action” for a player. Each player can play the game by selecting
an action from its own set of “actions” or strategies, Si. The definition of an “action” or a strategy
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s1, j = (r1, r2, r3, r4)
R1

r4

R4

C1

r1

r3
r2

R3

R2

Crisis
Resource Center

Fig 4.1 Formulation of a Strategy

plays a significant role in determining the outcome of any game. In our crisis scenario model, the
information available consists of,
•

Number of crisis locations,

•

Number of resource centers,

•

Time taken to travel from the resource centers to each crisis,

•

Priority of each crisis

•

Number of resources requested by each crisis

The crises are modeled as players and the amount of resources allocated to them constitutes a
strategy. Let C = {Ci} for i ≤ n, be a finite set of crises and R = {Rj} for j ≤ m be a finite set of
resource centers, where n ∈ N is the number of crises and m∈ N is the number of resource
centers. Let Si be the finite set of pure strategies available to crisis i ∈ C. In the context of this
work, we define a strategy as an n-tuple consisting of non-negative integers, one for each of the m
resource centers. We write,

si , j = (r1 , r2 ,..rk ...rm )

∀rk ∈ N and si , j ∈ S i

where s i , j denotes the jth strategy of the ith crisis and rk is number of resources contributed by
resource center Rk from its pool of resources.
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4.2 Generation of Strategies
The concept of a noncooperative, normal form game is used in this work. All the players
move simultaneously in a game which can be represented in a matrix form. Hence, it becomes
necessary to enumerate all possible and feasible allocation strategies before the game is played.
With each resource center equipped with rk resources, there are o1*o2*…ok*…om different
possibilities of allocating resources from the different centers to a crisis. Every crisis has its set of
allocation strategies,

S i = {s1 , s 2 ,....s g ( i ) }

where g(i) ≤ o1*o2*…ok*…om , g(i)∈ N, i = 1,2, …, n

We use a recursive algorithm to generate the combinations of allocations that each crisis can
select from. This is repeated for each of the crises. Figure 3.4 shows the algorithm used to
generate these combinations. During the process of generating the strategies, we apply certain
constraints on them to eliminate infeasible strategies.

R1 R2 R3
R1
5

0

0

0

R2

0

0

1

4

0

0

2

0

1

0

0

1

1

.
.

. .
. .

5

3

2

5

4

0

5

4

1

5

4

2

R3
2

Resource Pool

Strategy Set
Fig 4.2 Generation of Strategies
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Algorithm: GenStrat - Generation of strategies for each crisis
Input: Resource array containing number of resource units in each center - R[m], Number of
resource centers m, Crisis array containing requests of each crisis – C[n],Number of crises n
Output: Set of strategies Si for each crisis
Declare T[m] ← Temporary array
Declare head ← Pointer to ordered list of strategies
for crises in Ci , i ← 1 to n
Strategy Set Si ← Call RecStrat (R, m, C, n, T, 0, head)
end

Fig 4.3 Algorithm to Generate Strategies

4.2.1 Pruning of Strategies
Since this is a game of complete information, the number of resources requested by a
crisis location is known. During the allocation of a strategy to a crisis, it is imperative that a crisis
is not allocated more resources than it needs. This is to avoid unfair allocation and wastage of
resources. Resources that were allocated in excess of the requirement could have been used for
crises whose needs are more urgent or for other crises which might occur.
Let Q = {qi} be the set of requirements of all the crises where i = 1, 2, ... n and qi ∈ N.
Similarly, let O = {oj} be the set of the resources available at the resource centers where j = 1, 2,
…, m and oj ∈ N. We apply our first constraint to the strategy generation process.
For any strategy, si, j ∈ Si, ∑rk ≤ qi where i = 1, 2, …, n and k = 1, 2, …, m

---------- (1)

The above statement implies that in any strategy si, j belonging to crisis Ci, the sum of all
the entries in the strategy tuple should not exceed the requirement qi of that crisis. For e.g., if
crisis C1 requires 4 resources and it has two strategies – s1,1(1,2,1) and s1,2(1,2,2), the strategy s1,2 ,
2nd strategy of crisis C1, is invalid as 1+2+2 = 5 > 4.
While generating strategies, it should be kept in mind that the individual entries in a
strategy tuple should not exceed the availability of the corresponding resource center. Hence, we
arrive at the second constraint on the strategies.
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For any strategy, si, j ∈ Si, rk ≤ ok

where i = 1, 2, …, n and k = 1, 2, …, m

------------- (2)

The above condition indicates that in any strategy si,j belonging to crisis Ci, the individual entries
in the strategy tuple i.e. si, j = (r1, r2, r3 ,… rk,…, rm), should not exceed the corresponding resource
center’s total capacity i.e. r1 ≤ p1 , r2 ≤ p2 , r3 ≤ p3 ,… rk ≤ pk ,…, rm ≤ pm. For e.g., Let there be three
resource centers R1, R2 and R3, with capacities 3, 4 and 2 units respectively. A strategy si, j = (4, 3,
2) (jth strategy of ith crisis) is invalid as the first entry in the tuple corresponding to the
contribution of resource center R1 is 4 whereas the capacity of R1 is 3.

Algorithm: RecursiveStrat - Generation of strategies for each crisis
Input: Resource array containing number of resource units in each center - R[m], Number of resource
centers m, Crisis array containing requests of each crisis – C[n],Number of crises n, Temporary array
T[m], Variables curr, Pointer to ordered list of strategies head
Output: Strategy set Si
temp = curr + 1
if temp == m then
last = 1;
else
last = 0;
end
for resource units in Ri , i  1 to curr
T[curr] = i;
if last == 1 then
head  Call AddStrat
else
head  Call RecursiveStrat (R, m, C, n, T, curr+1, head)
end
end
return head

Fig 4.4 Recursive Algorithm to Generate Strategy Set for each Crisis

4.2.2

Cost Function
In modeling this problem, we provide the user with an option to select n best strategies

from each crisis’s set and play the game. These strategies are ordered in ascending order of cost
to the crisis. Here cost is not tangible and is used as a measure of practicality. The objective
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behind the ordering is to sort the strategies by those that provide the greatest number of resources
in the shortest possible time. In a strategy, we compare the time taken to reach a crisis from each
resource center and the number of resources contributed by that resource center as the factors in
determining the cost of that strategy.
Let T = {ti, j} be the set of measures of time taken to reach each of the crises from the resource
centers. ti, j is the time taken to reach the ith crisis from the jth resource center. Here i = 1, 2, …, n
and j = 1, 2, …, m where n is the number of crises and m is the number of resource centers. For
any strategy,

t i,m 
 t i ,1 t i , 2
, ,.......,
 for any strategy si , j = (r1 , r2 ,..rk ...rm ) …….. (3)
rm 
 r1 r2

Cost (si, j) = min 

Cost (si, j) measures the ratio between the time taken to reach a crisis i from each of the resource
centers in a strategy tuple si, j and the number of units contributed by each of the resource centers.
It is not uncommon for two strategies to have the same cost. In such a case, we examine
the two strategies and look for the next lowest value of the ratio in the tuples. The strategy with
the next lower value is ranked higher among the two strategies being compared. Let Cost (si, j) =

ti, p
t i,m 
t i,m 
 t i ,1 t i , 2
 t i ,1 t i , 2
and Cost (si, k) = min  ,
, ,.......,
,.......,
 = a where a =
= b
rp
rm 
rm 
 r1 r2
 r1 r2

min 

where b =

t i ,q
rq

where (si, j) and (si, k) are jth and kth strategies of crisis i.

 t i ,1 t i , 2 t i , p −1 t i , p +1
t i , m 
,
,...
,
....,
 , and
r p −1 rp +1
rm 
 r1 r2

If a = b, then compare min 

 t i ,1 t i , 2 t i ,q −1 t i ,q +1
t i ,m 
,
,...
,
....,

rq −1 rq +1
rm 
 r1 r2

min 
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………………. (4)

Generate Strategy

Calculate Cost

No

Is there another
strategy (s) in the
ordered list with the
same cost?

Yes

Is the next lowest cost in
the tuple different from
next lowest values in the
other strategy (s) with
the same cost?

Yes

The strategy with the next
lowest value is ranked higher

No
Compare the sum of the resources contributed by the strategy
with the other strategy (s) with the same cost.

The strategy contributing the higher
number of resources is ranked higher

Add strategy to the ordered list of strategies in the
appropriate place in ascending order of cost

Fig 4.5 Flowchart Illustrating Ordering of Strategies
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Algorithm: AddStrat - Add strategy to strategy set of each crisis
Input: Strategy S[m], Number of resource centers m, Pointer to ordered list of strategies head, Crisis
array containing requests of each crisis – C[n],Number of crises n
Output: Pointer to ordered list of strategies head
Declare sum ← Temporary Variable
for resource units in Si , i ← 1 to m
sum ← sum + Si
end
if sum ≤ C[present crisis] then
Compute cost of strategy S
Determine order strategy in list of strategies based on cost
Add strategy to strategy set
end
return head

Fig 4.6 Algorithm to Add a Strategy to a Strategy Set

The process above (4) is repeated until we find two unequal costs. If two strategies being
compared have identical

t i ,k
rk

values in their tuples, we compare the two strategies for the one

which contributes the higher sum total of resources to the crisis. The strategy contributing the
higher number of resources is ranked higher among the two strategies being compared,
i.e. compare ∑rk where k = 1, 2, ..., m in (si, j) and (si, k) for the higher value ....................... (5)

We perform the ordering of the strategies at the time of generation to avoid the additional
overhead of sorting a huge list of strategies at the end thereby adding the time taken to sort
strategies of each of the crises to the overall computation time. Figure 3.5 shows the process of
ordering of strategies.
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Payoffs to Player 1

Player 2

Player 1

s2,1

s2,2

s1,1

1, 1

2, 3

s1,2

3, 2

4, 1

s2,2

s1,1

1

2

s1,2

3

4

Payoffs to Player 2

a) Typical 2-player Normal form game
representation
c) Typical 3-player Normal
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Figure 4.7 Normal Form Game Representation

39

4.3 Payoff Modeling
A normal form representation of an n-player game is specified with,
•

A finite set of n players,

•

A finite set of strategies S = {S1, S2,..., Sn}for each player

•

A utility/payoff function ui to be applied on the set S

Figure 3.7 shows the typical representation and our representation of a 2-player game. In (a), the
strategies of player 1 are vertical and the strategies of player 2 are horizontal. Each cell has two
entries – the first entry is the payoff to player 1 and the second entry is the payoff to player 2
when player 1 and player 2 choose the strategies at the far left and top respectively. Similarly, in
(c) the matrix is divided into two parts. Each part is similar to (a) but represents a payoff when a
third player chooses its first strategy (left half) and its second strategy (second half). In (b) and
(d), we divide (a) into two matrices and (c) into three matrices respectively, one for each player’s
payoffs for choosing a particular combination.

4.3.1 Creation of Payoff Matrices
A normal form game can be represented as a matrix. For the purpose of our
implementation we create n payoff matrices, one for each crisis. In our representation of the
payoff matrices in Figure 3.8, the first column of each crisis’s matrix holds its strategies, one on
each row starting from the second row. The first row of the crisis’s matrix holds the combinations
of strategies selected by all the other crises, one on each column starting from the second column.
The ‘X’ in the first matrix is for the payoff for the first crisis when C1 selects s1,1 and C2 selects
s2,1 and C3 selects s3,1.
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Strategy Sets for
Crises – C1, C2 and C3
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Fig 4.8 Structure of Payoff Matrices for Crises

4.3.2 The Payoff Function
In any game, the best action for any player depends on the actions of the other players. A
payoff to a crisis for choosing a particular strategy when the other crises make their selection can
be represented as a gain to the crisis or a loss to the other crises. In our model, we depict it as a
summation of the losses to the other players and each player tries to maximize this loss to other
players. The payoff to a crisis is representative of the loss incurred by the other crises on the
allocation of a particular strategy to the crisis in question and the remaining crises are allocated
their strategies. Essentially, the possible combinations of strategies remain the same. Each matrix
captures the payoff to a particular crisis for a particular combination.
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In our model, every crisis is assigned a priority L on a scale of 1 to 10 to indicate its
severity. This priority is used as a weight in a payoff function to facilitate the calculation of the
loss to a crisis(s).
Payoff to kth strategy of ith crisis when the crises t ≠ i choose sm≠i, l Є {S1, S2... Si-1, Si+1, Sn} is
given by,

 n m

 ∑∑ ((r j , St ≠i ,l (o j − r j , St =i ,k )) − (r j , St ≠i ,l o j )) ∗ Lt ≠i  - constant


 t =1 j =1


rj , St ≠ i ,l Resources contributed by the jth resource center of lth strategy of crisis Ct≠i
r j ,St =i ,k Resources contributed by the jth resource center of kth strategy of crisis Ct=i
oj

Total number of resources available at resource center Rj

Lt≠i

Priority of crisis Ct≠i

M

Number of resource centers

n

Number of crises

(

The term r j , St ≠ i ,l

(o

j

− r j , St =i ,k )) refers to the ratio between the resources contributed by

a strategy and number of resources available from that resource center after allocating to the crisis

(

)

in question, Ci. The term r j , St ≠ i ,l o j refers to the ratio between the resources contributed by a
strategy and number of resources available from that resource center without allocating to the
crisis in question, Ci. The difference captures the loss to the crises Ct≠i and the priority of the
crises adds a weight to the loss. The last term of the expression, constant, is value which is either
0 or ∞. If the combination of strategies is feasible, then constant = 0, else constant = ∞ (or a very
high number).
Consider a combination of strategies, {s1, p, s2, q, ...., sn, r}. Let {r∑1, r∑2,
resources.
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...,

r∑m} be the sum of

(r1, r2, ..., rm)

belonging to s1, p

+

(r1, r2, ..., rm)

belonging to s2, q

+

......

+

(r1, r2, ..., rm)

....................
belonging to sn, r

___________
(r∑1, r∑2, ..., r∑m)

If r∑i ≥ oi for any i = 1, 2, ..., m, the combination of strategies becomes infeasible.

4.4 Algorithm to Approximate Nash Equilibrium
We apply a variant of the Scarf-Hansen fixed-point algorithm [69, 70] to approximate a
Nash Equilibrium point in our noncooperative game. The algorithm is based on a combinatorial
theorem [69] which is expressed in terms of a primitive set. Consider a collection of hdimensional vectors X = (x1, x2, ...., xh) of the form (m1 /D, ..., mh /D) with each value greater than
or equal to -1 and summing up to D which is a very large number, typically a multiple of the
number of crises. Let the numerators of the vectors in X be [69],

M=

m11

m12

....

m1h

m21

m22

....

m2h

.

.

.

.

.

.

mh1

mh2

....

mhh

The above matrix is a primitive set if and only if and there is a rearrangement of the columns and
a permutation of the labels of the columns, I(l) such that[69],
1. The lth column is identical to column l-1, except for the two rows I(l)-1 and I(l)
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2. mk,l = mk,l-1 + 1
mk,l = mk,l-1 – 1

for k = I(l)-1
for k = I(l)

Note: For l = 1, l-1 = h. Similarly, I(l) = 1, I(l) – 1 = h
Fig 3.9 shows the steps of the algorithm used to compute the Nash Equilibrium solution. As
shown in the figure the output is a probability vector p = (p1, p2,..... pi... pn). pi is a probability
distribution over the strategy set Si of crisis Ci.
pi = {pi,j} where j ≤ n and i ≤ gj, total number of strategies in Sj
Algorithm: NashSolve - Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Input: n – number of crises, X, Payoff matrices
Output: Probability vector p
Calculate h = Total number of strategies of all crises – n +1
While label of xj ≠ 1
Let xj be an arbitrary nonnegative vector from X. We associate it with the probability vectors
(

p1j , p 2j ,.... p nj ) as follows:

t0 = 0 and ti = si -1 where i = 1, 2,..., n and si is the number of strategies of crisis Ci
i −1

rki = 1 + ∑ t v + k
v =0
j
rki

p kj,i = n ⋅ x

where k = 1, ...., ti and i = 1,...... ,n
where k = 1, ...., ti and i = 1,...... ,n

ti

p sji ,i = 1 − ∑ p kj,i

where

i =1

if

p

j
si , i

pkj,i ≥ 0

≥ 0 then
Let Bki = Bki (

p1j ,.., pij−1 , p ij+1 .... p nj ) be the expected payoff to a crisis it uses its kth

strategy and ki is the lowest index for which

Bki i ( p1j ,.., pij−1 , p ij+1 .... p nj ) ≥ Bki ( p1j ,.., pij−1 , p ij+1 .... p nj )
The vector xj is labeled 1 +

i −1

∑t
u =0

u

+ ki ,

where i = min{ l

Perform replacement step
end
if

psji ,i < 0 or psji ,i = 0 for all i or ki = si for all i with psji ,i > 0 then
xj is labeled 1
Terminate algorithm

end
end

Fig 4.9 Algorithm to Approximate Nash Equilibrium
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| p sjl ,l > 0 and kl ≠ si}

We compute

maxj (pi,j) for each i

The Nash Equilibrium solution is given by,

{

NS i = s i ,max j ( pi , j )

}

maxj (pi,j) corresponds to the strategy with maximum value of probability among strategies of a
crisis. In the event that there are two strategies with identical probabilities, we pick the one with
the lower cost to the crisis.

4.5

Software Implementation
Crisis management encompasses a whole range of activities from “sensing” a crisis to

deployment of resources to monitoring of crisis development. The objective of our work is to
provide an automated mechanism for determining the number of units assigned to each crisis
location based on priority and requirement. In this work, we have implemented a tool that
Crisis Alert Mechanism
eg. “Sense and Respond System”

Crisis Damage Assessment

Mitigation of crisis and deployment of
resources

Monitor crisis development and other
possible crises eg. CMS

Recovery

Fig 4.10 Overview of Crisis Management System
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determines an optimal allocation of resources in a multi-crisis environment. The user provides a
set of inputs to the system, namely, resource capacities, crisis requests, crisis priorities and
response time information. The software evaluates the information using the underlying algorithm
and presents the user with an optimal allocation of resources from each center. In Fig 4.11, the
grey box indicates where our tool for allocation of resources to crises will fit into a crisis
management model.

4.5.1

System Input and Output
Every system is unique in the nature of inputs fed into it and the output presented to the

user. Below are the specifications of the input and the output of our system:
Input:
•

Number of crises (2 - 5 crises)

•

Number of resource centers (2 – 10 centers)

•

Resources requested by each crisis (8 – 15 resources)

•

Resources available at each resource center (2 – 10 resources)

•

Priority of each crisis (1 – 10; 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest)

•

Time taken to travel between crisis and resource center (in minutes)

Output:
Allocation consisting of combination of resources contributed by each resource center
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4.5.2

Object-Oriented Design
We have used an object oriented design to implement our solution because of the two

main benefits:
Maintainability – This is achieved through a simplified mapping to the problem domain, which
results in less analysis effort, less complexity in system design and easier user verification.
Reusability – Segments of the structured code can be reused by adding new functionalities with
slight or no modification. This reduces implementation time, localizes the modifications in code
when a change in implementation is required and also increases the possibility that prior testing
has removed bugs.
The programming language used to implement it is C++. It was chosen because of its
ability to program in a C-like style, or an object-oriented style or both and also its ability to utilize
the predefined classes and be able to create user-defined classes to characterize the features of the
input. Object oriented design allows us to organize data into discrete, distinguishable entities
called objects. A single object has a state and behavior associated with it. For example, in our
work, crises and resource centers are objects. Each has its own characteristics and behavior. A
crisis is described in terms of it severity, requests and location. A resource center is described in
terms of its capacity. Furthermore, each object has its own characteristic behavior. For example,
each crisis generates its strategy set.
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4.5.3

Overview of Classes and Functions
We have the following four classes with object functions in our implementation:
Table 4.1 Overview of Classes Used
Class

Attributes

Behavior

Resource Center

Name, Capacity

-

Crisis

Name, Priority, Number

•

of Strategies, Pointer to
Strategy Set, Response

Recursively generates all possible
allocations from resource centers

•

Adds a strategy to its set

Resource center

•

Sorts its strategies based on cost

Name, Number of

•

Generates rows and columns of a

time from each

Payoff Matrix

Crises, Number of
combinations, Structure

matrix
•

Computes payoffs

•

Computes the Nash Equilibrium

for each Combination
Nash

Primitive Set, X Vector,
Probability Vector, D, n,
k array and t array

The following functions have been used:
RecNum()
•

Class : Crisis

•

Input : Number of resource centers, resource center capacities

•

Function : Generate strategies for a crisis from the available resources from each center

AddStrat()
•

Class : Crisis
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•

Input : Strategy of a crisis

•

Function : Add strategy to a crisis’ strategy set

costSort()
•

Class : Crisis

•

Input : Strategy of a crisis

•

Function : Locate the ordering of a strategy based on its cost

compareStrategy()
•

Class : Crisis

•

Input : Strategies having the same cost

•

Function : Determine ordering of two strategies with same cost

GenerateComIndex()
•

Class : PayoffMatrix

•

Input : Number of crises

•

Function : Generate indexes for combination of strategies belonging to different crises

generateComIndex()
•

Class : PayoffMatrix

•

Input : Number of crises

•

Function : Generate indexes for combination of strategies belonging to different crises

getRowStrategy()
•

Class : PayoffMatrix

•

Input : Number of crises
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•

Function : Generate strategies in each row of payoff matrix

getColumnStrategy()
•

Class : PayoffMatrix

•

Input : Number of crises, Strategy set of each crisis

•

Function : Generate combinations of strategies in each column of payoff matrix

getPayoff()
•

Class : PayoffMatrix

•

Input : Number of crises

•

Function : Compute payoffs in the payoff matrix of each crisis

selectedStrategy()
•

Class : Nash

•

Input : Crises, resource centers, payoff matrices

•

Function : Determine the optimal allocation for each crisis
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Crisis Request

Resource Center Capacity

Priority

Response Time

Generate Strategy Set for each Crisis

Apply Constraints on the Strategies in each Set based on
- Crisis Request
- Resource Center Capacity

Compute Cost of each Strategy and place
it in Ascending order

Generate Combinations of Strategies and Construct
Payoff Matrices
Calculate Payoffs for each Strategy Combination
in the Payoff Matrices

Apply Hansen’s Algorithm to Compute
Nash Equilibrium

Obtain Probability Vector and determine Strategies
that form Nash Equilibrium

Optimal Allocation of Resources

Fig 4.11 Workflow Model of the Proposed System
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

This chapter presents a set of experimental results to verify the efficacy of the solution
obtained using our implementation. The implementation has been divided into three phases –
generation of strategies, computation of payoff matrices and finally, the generation of the Nash
Equilibrium solution. For the integration of the three phases, the output of each phase is made
compatible for the next step. The user inputs information regarding number of crises, requests,
response times and criticality levels. C++ is the programming language chosen for implementing
our tool to obtain an optimal solution. The object-oriented characteristic of C++ facilitates
modeling of the characteristics of players and strategies, and the modularization of the
implementation.
In this chapter, we observe the performance of our approach in various crisis scenarios by
varying the inputs and noting its effects on execution time and quality of the solution. It is logical
to assume that as the dimensionality of an input set increases, so does the execution time of an
implementation. In our implementation, the process of generating strategies and the computation
a Nash Equilibrium are time intensive tasks and we examine the effect of increasing number of
crises on the execution time. Also, the total availability of resources in a resource pool versus the
total demand or requests made by crises are contributing factors in determining the quality of the
solution.
We have performed experiments on various test cases by altering inputs such as crisis
requests and resource center capacities. The test cases are used to study the effects of inputs on
the time taken to reach a solution and also to determine the quality of a solution. Furthermore, we
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apply the fairness measures as described in [79] to quantify the feasibility and fairness of the
implementation. All experiments were run on a Sun Fire V880 UltraSPARC III server that
features eight 900 MHz processors and 32 GB of memory running the SunOS.

5.1

Fairness
Typically, in a priority based system, a high priority event would receive its request and

the lower priority event would receive less than its fair share and possibly starve due to lack of
resources. This is not very different from a first-come-first-serve principle where the more critical
event is sent ahead in line to claim its share of resources. Although, it would seem logical to
allow a more critical event to satisfy its request, such a scheme suffers from a high degree of
unfairness. A priority-based system would perform reasonably well when there is sufficient
number of resources in the resource pool. However, the problem arises when the total demand
exceeds the total supply. Higher priority crises satisfy their requests, while lower priority crises
events suffer from starvation due to inevitable shortage. In a crisis environment, this is
unacceptable as starvation of a lesser priority crisis could lead to further loss in life and property
and increase the possibility of worsening of a crisis scenario.
Generally, a system is deemed to be fair or unfair based on whether or not it meets certain
requirements or not. Generally, a system is considered fair if it meets certain criteria on
throughput or delay, and it is considered unfair if these criteria are not met. For example, a
scheduling algorithm is fair or unfair depending on whether any user receives a throughput of x
bits/sec or not. In our system, fairness would be determined by whether or not a crisis receives its
share of resources. We use the fairness concepts of [79] to determine the fairness of our
implementation. In our approach, we compare the best-cost strategy of a crisis with the actualcost strategy, i.e. the cost of the strategy that is assigned as the Nash Equilibrium solution. A
measure of fairness of the system can be measured in terms of the self-fairness of the individual
crises. The proportion of the cost associated with crisis j that is deemed to be fair is given by,
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p fair , j =

cos t j ,lowest
i

∑ cos t
i =1

=

i , lowest

rj
rT

Here, cos t j ,lowest is the lowest or best cost strategy of a crisis. In Chapter 4, we have described
the ordering of strategies based on cost. We have used the term rj for brevity.

p actual , j =

cos t j ,actual
n

∑ cos t
i =1

i , actual

Here, cos t j ,actual is the cost of the strategy assigned to a crisis as part of the Nash Solution.
The definition of the self-fairness of a given user is,

fj =

log( p actual , j )
log(r j rT )

We also define,

1
log(r1 rT )
Ck =
1
1+
log(rk rT )
1+
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The values Ck are normalization constants. Their objective is to ensure that the maximum value of
the weighted average fairness is unity and the maximum occurs when each user consumes its fair
share of the resources. The average fairness of the system is given by,

n

F=

rT ∑ C k p k f k
k =1
n

∑C r
k =1

k k

The average fairness value of F ranges between 0 and 1. The value of unity results when a crisis
consumes resources using a strategy with the lowest possible cost.
Tables 5.1 (a-d) show the fairness measure for test cases with varying differences
between demand and supply. Every crisis attempts to select a strategy from its set of strategies
that costs the least. We observe a slight decrease in fairness as the total request for resources from
all the crises exceeds the total resources available from all the centers.

Table 5.1 Fairness Measures
Demand vs. Supply

Degree of Fairness

Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply

0.837309

Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply

0.827117

Total demand = Total availability

0.833342

Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply

0.803526

Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply

0.805155

(a) Crisis Scenario with 2 Crises
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Table 5.1 Continued
Demand vs. Supply

Degree of Fairness

Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply

0.811523

Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply

0.848788

Total demand = Total availability

0.891354

Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply

0.71144

Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply

0.781591

(b) Crisis Scenario with 3 Crises

Demand vs. Supply

Degree of Fairness

Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply

0.822978

Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply

0.818603

Total demand = Total availability

0.845423

Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply

0.710171

Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply

0.691537

(c) Crisis Scenario with 4 Crises

Demand vs. Supply

Degree of Fairness

Total demand 21%-50% less than total supply

0.789292

Total demand 1%-20% less than total supply

0.769231

Total demand = Total availability

0.769231

Total demand 1%-20% greater than total supply

0.769858

Total demand 21%-50% greater than total supply

0.769231

(d) Crisis Scenario with 5 Crises
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5.2

Execution Time
Although the optimality of the solution is important, the time taken to arrive at an optimal

solution is an important factor in determining the feasibility of our approach. For example, on the
occurrence of 3-4 crises simultaneously, a formulation which took more than 1-3 minutes would
not be tolerated. Every second utilized to construct a solution has a direct effect on the response
time of the emergency units and consequently on their ability to prevent damage. The nature of
the problem is such that we are limited in scope in terms of comparison with other works. We
analyze the implementation by varying the inputs and observing its effects on the runtime.
The graphs in Fig 5.1 reveal three important observations regarding the effect of inputs
on execution time. Firstly, all three graphs show the sudden increase in execution time as the
number of resource centers increases. As the number of resource centers reaches 8-9, there is an
exponential increase in the time. In Fig 5.1 (a) and (b), the number of resources in each center is
increased to 3 and 7 respectively. The trend in exponential increase persists over an increase in
resources per center with a sudden surge observed around 7-9 centers. The second observation is
that as the number of resources per center increases, the range of execution time increases
significantly. The range of execution time when there are 3 resources per center is 0 -14 seconds
in Fig. 5.1 (b) as compared to a range of 0 – 250 seconds when there are 7 resources per center in
Fig. 5.1 (a). The third observation is that as the number of crises increases, the execution time for
the same number of resource centers is higher. For example, in Fig. 5.1 (b), when the number of
resource centers is 9, a 2-crisis scenario takes around 110 seconds and a 4-crisis scenario takes
about 225 seconds. These observations typically aid a user in determining the range of an input
set used to produce an optimal solution within an acceptable time frame.
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Fig 5.1 Effect on Execution Time Due to Increase in Number of Resource Centers
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Fig 5.2 Effect of Increasing Number of Crises on Execution Time
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Another factor which determines the execution time is the number of crisis locations. Fig 5.2 is a
graph with a fixed number of total resources. Both the series show an increase in execution time
as the number of crises increases. In the pink series, the number of resources centers is 5 with 7
resources per center and the blue series is vice versa. Although the total number of resources is
constant, we observe that the series with 7 resource centers and 5 resources per center has a
higher execution time with the same number of crises. For ease of plotting the graph, we have
used the logarithm function to plot execution time.
For a fixed set of resource centers, capacities and request, as the number of crises
increases, the size of a game increases thereby increasing the time taken to arrive at the Nash
solution. Fig 5.3 shows this increase in the percentage of time taken to compute Nash Equilibrium
as the dimension of the problem increases.

Percentage Increase in Computation Time for Nash
Equilibrium with Increase in Number of Crises

Increase in Percentage of
Computation Time (%)

50
40
30
20
10
0
2

3

4

5

Number of Crises

Fig 5.3 Percentage Increase in Computation time of Nash Equilibrium
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5.3

Statistical Significance of Experimental Results for Execution Time
We perform regression analysis on our test data in order to determine the statistical

significance of our results. We perform linear regression analysis by using the "least squares"
method to fit a line through a set of observations. By doing so, we will be able to analyze how a
single dependent variable is affected by the values of one or more independent variables.

Table 5.2 Regression Analysis Results
Coefficient of
independence

Independent Variables

P- Value
(Confidence)

Number of crises

3.59

2.64E-12

Number of resource centers

2.10

5.76E-13

Number of resources per center

0.61

0.25

In the linear regression model, the dependent variable is assumed to be a linear function
of one or more independent variables plus an error introduced to account for all other factors.
Consider a dependent variable y and an independent variable x, the coefficient of y on x is given
by,

C=

∑ xy
x2

In our case, we examine execution time as the dependent variable and number of crises, number
of resource centers and number of resources per center as the independent variables. We observe
a significant impact of number of crises on the execution time. For every unit change in Log
(Number of Crises), Log (Execution Time) increases by 3.592021. Similarly, for every unit
change in Log (Number of resource centers) and Log (Number of resources per center), Log
(Execution Time) increases by 2.10 and 0.61 respectively.
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The p-value is the probability of finding a value as extreme or more extreme is a chance
given that the null hypothesis is true. A null hypothesis basically assumes that none of the
variables have any effect on the execution time. In our case, the p-values for number of crises,
number of resource centers and number of resources per center are 2.64E-12, 5.76E-13 and 0.25.
In this chapter, we have examined the various aspects of our solution. We have quantified
the fairness of our implementation and found fairness measures as high as 0.89. We derived
significant inferences regarding the relationship between the various input parameters – crisis
requests, resource availabilities and number of resource centers. Finally, we evaluated our test
cases to understand the dependent and independent variables in the system and also verified the
confidence of our test cases.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

6.1

Conclusions
Crisis management has gained considerable importance over the last few years and the

automation of allocation of emergency services is a logical step toward erasing human error. Each
crisis in a multi-crisis scenario makes a request for a certain number of resources. A conflicting
situation occurs when there is a shortage of resources or competition for resources from the same
center. Although, each crisis has varying degrees of severity it is highly essential to cater to each
crisis’ request in the best possible manner. We have proposed an approach using game theory to
allocate an optimal number of resources in a multi-crisis environment. Our method is a novel way
of modeling a crisis scenario in a game theoretic framework and obtaining an allocation of
resources that benefits all the crises in the game.
We have examined the effects of various input parameters like number of crises, resource
capacities etc on the execution time. We have examined the effect of increasing crisis on the
overall execution time of the system. Although, the implementation is affected significantly by
the dimensions of the inputs, it has shown a degree of fairness of up to 0.89 in its results and can
be used as a basis for modeling other resource allocation problems and obtaining feasible
solutions. We have performed a linear regression analysis on our test cases and found the degrees
of dependence between the variables and verified the confidence of our test cases.
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6.2

Future Work
In the experiments that we performed, we restricted ourselves in the number of resource

centers and the number of resources per center due to constraints on execution time. We need to
investigate additional schemes to prune strategy spaces more effectively and improve the
definition of a strategy in order to enhance the performance of the algorithm with increased
dimensionality of the input set. The process of generation of strategies provides scope for
parallelism which could improve execution time. Also, we need to explore additional factors that
can be incorporated to enrich the payoff function like traffic delays, crisis growth probability, etc
in order to obtain the best possible representation of a real life crisis environment and improve the
quality of the solution.
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